PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCY COMMISSION

INSTITUTIONAL REPORT – ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Defined Terms

Assist OPS – RCMP Ottawa Command: Assist OPS (NCR)

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CBSA – Canada Border Services Agency

CIRG – Community Industry Response Group

Coutts POE – the Canada-USA border crossing in Coutts, AB

DLT – Divisional Liaison Team

EEMO – Emergency Economic Measures Order, SOR/2022-22

EMR – Emergency Measures Regulations, SOR/2022-21

GAC – Global Affairs Canada

Gatineau Police – Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau

GSB – Gold Silver Bronze Command System

ICC – Integrated Command Centre for the NCR

IMCIT – Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team

Joint Intelligence Group – Federal Policing GSB Joint Intelligence Group

MOA – Memorandum of Agreement

NCC – National Capital Commission

NCR – National Capital Region

NCRCC – National Capital Region Command Centre

Ontario *PSA - Police Services Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15

OPP – Ontario Provincial Police

OPS – Ottawa Police Services

Ottawa MOA – the February 10, 2022 MOA between OPS and RCMP, as subsequently amended

PacHighway POE – the Pacific Highway border crossing, between Surrey, British Columbia, and Blaine, Washington

PIU – Protective Intelligence Unit

POE – Ports of Entry

POJ – police of jurisdiction

PPS – Parliamentary Protective Services

QRT – Quick Response Team

RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RCMP Act - Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c. R-10

RCMP Regulations - Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations 2014, SOR/2014-281

SQ - Sûreté du Québec

TSG – Tactical Support Group

WPS – Windsor Police Services

PUBLIC ORDER EMERGENCY COMMISSION

INSTITUTIONAL REPORT – ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

1.   RCMP OVERVIEW

1.   The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was established in 1873 and is currently composed of more than 19,000 police officers and over 11,000 civilians and public servants. It has over 700 detachments across Canada and engages in policing activities in hundreds of communities.

1.1   RCMP's Core Responsibilities and Duties

2.   The RCMP's core responsibilities and duties include preserving the peace and preventing crime.[1] As described below in more detail, the RCMP provides policing services in several ways including providing front line community policing services pursuant to contracts with other levels of government, providing federal policing services, and providing specialized and technical police services (such as forensic analysis) within the RCMP and to law enforcement partners.

1.1.1   Contract and Indigenous Policing

3.   The RCMP provides community policing services pursuant to contracts with each province and territory of Canada, except Ontario and Quebec, as well as over 150 municipalities.

4.   Contract policing pertains to the general administration of justice: preservation of the peace, prevention of crime, and fulfilment of all duties as outlined under the laws of Canada or the laws of respective provinces and territories.[2]

---

[1] *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act*, RSC 1985 (*RCMP Act*), c. R-10, s. 3, 18; *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations 2014*, SOR/2014-281 (*RCMP Regulations),* s. 14
[2] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2022-2023 Departmental Plan" (last modified 2 March 2022), online

5.   The RCMP provides contract policing though Police Service Agreements. The federal government negotiates these agreements with participating provinces, territories, and municipalities. Police Service Agreements currently cover 75% of the geography of Canada, including much of rural Canada, all of the Canadian North, and many towns and large urban areas in contract provinces. The RCMP also provides culturally responsive community policing services in First Nation and Inuit communities.[3]

1.1.2   Federal Policing

6.   Federal policing is a core responsibility of the RCMP in every province and territory. Under the RCMP's federal policing mandate, its members, in addition to having the full responsibilities of peace officers under the *Criminal* Code, enforce laws under a diverse array of authorities provided in more than two hundred and fifty federal statutes.

7.   Operationally, federal policing also includes protective policing services that ensure the safety of designated major events,[4] foreign missions, and dignitaries. These protected persons include the Prime Minister, Governor General, Ministers of the Crown, Supreme Court and designated Federal Court judges, internationally protected persons, as well as others designated by the Minister of Public Safety as requiring protection. Protective operations also provide protection for various federal properties in the National Capital Region (NCR) and enforce traffic on a small number of federal roadways in the NCR.

8.   The RCMP's federal policing mandate includes the investigation of Transnational Serious and Organized Crime[5], Cybercrime,[6] and National Security,[7] which also includes Money

---

[3] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "First Nations and Inuit Policing Program" (last modified 24 August 2021), online

[4] Designated Major Event examples include Canada Day, Royal Tours, Dignitary Visits to Canada, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

[5] This priority includes: (1) organized crime (the trafficking of drugs, humans or weapons, including the proceeds of these activities); (2) money laundering (targeting professional money launderers and international money controller networks); and (3) border integrity (serious criminal activity at seaport, airports and points of entry.

[6] This priority includes: (1) cyber-enabled criminal activity, including suspected organized crime groups targeting Canadians or critical infrastructure through the exploitation of cyber systems; (2) providing cyber services to enable crime; and (3) foreign-influenced cybercrime, including espionage, sabotage and attacks against critical infrastructure suspected of being orchestrated by a foreign government.

[7] This priority includes: (1) terrorism with a nexus to Canada, and (2) terrorism with foreign influence.

Laundering and Financial Crime. In enforcing federal statutes, the RCMP often work with other government departments and agencies. For example, the RCMP works with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to secure Canada's borders. In particular, while CBSA is responsible for Ports of Entry (POEs) along the Canadian-US Border, the RCMP is responsible for border integrity *between* POEs.

1.1.3   Specialized Policing Services

9.   Specialized Policing Services in the RCMP provides technical investigative services as well as the stewardship and delivery of a cluster of programs known as National Police Services.

10.   These services are available internally to the RCMP, and externally to Canadian law enforcement and criminal justice partners, and select foreign organizations.[8]

11.   National Police Services provides critical front-line operational support services in areas such as forensic analyses, firearms, criminal records, advanced police technology, combatting child sexual exploitation, and locating missing persons. [9]

12.   The National Police Services portfolio currently includes the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, the Canadian Police College, the Canadian Police Information Centre, the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada, the National Forensic Laboratory Service, the National DNA Data Bank, the Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Service, the Canadian Firearms Program, the Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System and National Sex Offender Registry, and the National Cybercrime Coordination Unit.

1.2   RCMP's Organization and Reporting Structure

1.2.1   Generally

13.   The Commissioner of the RCMP has the control and management of the RCMP and all matters connected with the RCMP. [10] There are fifteen provincial and territorial Divisions, as

---

[8] PB.CAN.00001601_REL
[9] PB.CAN.00001601_REL
[10] *RCMP Act,* s. 5(1)

well as a National Division and a Training Division, known as Depot. Each Division is under the direction of a Commanding Officer or Director General.[11]

14. National Headquarters has a nation-wide focus, and is located in Ottawa. National programs are led by nine Business Lines based at National Headquarters, each led by a Deputy Commissioner and/or civilian and public servant equivalents, including:

1. Federal Policing;
2. Contract and Indigenous Policing;
3. Special Policing Services;
4. Corporate Management and Comptrollership;
5. Human Resources;
6. Internal Audit and Evaluation;
7. Legal Services;
8. Professional Responsibility Sector; and
9. Strategic Policy and External Relations.[12]

15. Provincial and Territorial Divisions deliver national programs within their geographic areas of responsibility:

B Division	Newfoundland and Labrador
C Division	Québec
D Division	Manitoba
E Division	British Columbia
F Division	Saskatchewan
G Division	Northwest Territories
H Division	Nova Scotia
J Division	New Brunswick
K Division	Alberta
L Division	Prince Edward Island
M Division	Yukon Territory

---

[11] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "2020-2021 Annual Report to Parliament – Administration of the *Access to Information Act*", online
[12] *Ibid.*

O Division	Ontario
V Division	Nunavut

1.2.2 Regional Layout

16. Policing and the administration of justice falls under the constitutional responsibility of the provinces and territories, which delegate fiscal and governance responsibility to municipal governments.

17. In areas where the RCMP provides front-line community policing services through a Police Services Agreement with a provincial, territorial or municipal government, cost-sharing agreements authorize the RCMP (under section 20 of the *RCMP Act*) to act as the police of jurisdiction (POJ). Ontario, Quebec, and their municipalities currently do not have any such agreements.

1.2.3 National Division

18. The RCMP's National Division was established in April 2013 with a dual mandate: Sensitive and International Investigations, and Protective Policing Services. As of May 2022, the RCMP has begun consolidating National Division into other structures.[13]

19. National Division's Protective Policing Services are part of the RCMP's federal policing mandate, which is discussed in section 1.1.2. National Division works closely with other policing organizations, including Ottawa Police Service (OPS) and the Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS), to deliver its protective policing services.

20. National Division was also involved in federal policing investigations which include Sensitive and International Investigations, an Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, and a Cybercrime Team.

---

[13] PB.CAN.00001598_REL

1.3   RCMP Policies, Procedures, Protocols, and Orders

21.   In addition to following the rule of law, all police services are also governed by policies, procedures, and protocols which are usually contained in various service "manuals". When a policy is changed or a protocol is amended, updated orders are communicated to employees via Communiqués.

22.   RCMP National Policies and Procedures that govern RCMP programs and policing services are published for RCMP members in two national manuals: (1) the Administrative Manual and (2) the Operational Manual. Both the Administrative Manual and Operational Manual have subsidiary manuals on specific topics (e.g., asset management and tactical operations). Each manual is organized by Part and Chapter. Regional, Divisional, Unit Manuals, and (in some areas) unit-level Standard Operating Procedures supplement and correspond to the national manuals.

1.4   Tactical Support Groups

23.   Most RCMP Divisions have Tactical Support Groups (TSG) made up of specially trained members. These form a component of the Force's Critical Incident Program. TSGs provide tactical support, at the request of POJ, to ensure safe and peaceful gatherings and lawful assemblies. TSGs maintain public safety, while also protecting and upholding Canadian laws and individuals' rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly.[14]

24.   The TSG in the NCR is composed of uniformed members who volunteer from National Division, O Division, and National Headquarters. They are generally deployed upon request of the POJ in the NCR or RCMP protective operations. Requests for mobilization are generally part of event planning, at an operational level between OPS and RCMP locally. TSG duties are performed part-time by the volunteer members in addition to their regular duties.

25.   The NCR's TSG fulfills various roles and functions in the NCR, either as part of the federal policing mandate, or at the request of the POJ, including:

---

[14]Please note that the TSG for L and H division is combined, in addition G division does not have a TSG.

- assisting with public order events that focus on protected locations and persons;
- providing support for planned venue searches;
- helping with surge capacity;
- providing specialized mobility tasks, such as driving vehicles and vessels, for the Emergency Response Team operations;
- providing a capacity to secure large areas cleared by the Emergency Response Team; and
- setting up collection points for suspects, casualties and witnesses, and assisting in processing and preservation of evidence at critical incidents.

2. JURISDICTION

2.1 Policies on RCMP Jurisdiction

26. RCMP members, as peace officers, have the authority to enforce federal laws, including the *Criminal Code*, throughout Canada. However, provincial governments have jurisdiction over the administration of justice within that province, which includes local policing.[15] Except where the RCMP has contracted with a province, as discussed in section 1.1.1, local policing is the responsibility of provincial or municipal policing services. Federal policing (including protective policing), as discussed in section 1.1.2, remains the RCMP's responsibility throughout Canada.

2.1.1 National Capital Region General Duty Protective Policing Standard Operation Procedures – "Police Agencies and Jurisdiction"

2.2 Ottawa Police Services (OPS)

27. "Police Agencies and Jurisdiction" was a unit-level Protective Policing - General Duty Standard Operating Procedure that outlined the jurisdictional reach of protective policing. It outlined the protective policing jurisdiction within the NCR, which includes the criminal investigation of national security offences, threats against national security, or offences

---

[15] *The Constitution Act, 1867,* 30 &31 Vict, c 3, s. 92(14)

against designated protected persons and sites. This jurisdiction also includes enforcing the protective policing mandate, and the policy sets out the protective policing general duty officers' status as peace officers, as well as the existing limitations of that status. This standard operating procedure was not in force during the events at issue, as general NCR protective policy was undergoing revision.

28. OPS is the POJ in the City of Ottawa. Where there is a violation of the *Criminal Code*, they are the primary entity that will investigate and respond. This includes the Parliamentary Precinct and Parliament Hill. The responsibility of OPS to provide policing services for Ottawa, including public order maintenance, is established by section 4 of the Ontario *Police Services Act*[16] (Ontario *PSA*). Wellington and Sparks Streets, the central locus of the blockade in Ottawa, are within the jurisdiction of OPS.

29.   OPS may seek additional funding for its own expenses under Public Safety's Nation's Capital Extraordinary Policing Costs Program, which exists in recognition of the additional policing expenses faced by the City of Ottawa due to its role as Canada's capital.

2.3   Ontario Provincial Police (OPP)

30.   Under the Ontario *PSA*, the OPP has a dual mandate to provide frontline policing services to 328 municipalities in Ontario, while also providing assistance or specialized support to individual municipal police services, at their request. Where a municipal police service makes such a request, it may remain lead, as the POJ, with respect to the overall policing approach and response.

31.   The Government of Ontario can also make arrangements for additional support.[17] Section 55 of the Ontario *PSA* provides:

> *55 (1) In an emergency, the [Ontario] Solicitor General may make an agreement with the Crown in right of Canada or of another province or with any of its agencies for the provision of police services.*

---

[16] *Police Services Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15 (Ontario *PSA*)
[17] Ontario *PSA*, s. 9(8)

(2) The agreement authorizes all peace officers to whom it relates to act as police officers in the area to which the agreement relates.

32.   During the blockade in Ottawa in January and February 2022, the RCMP provided assistance through a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the RCMP and OPS, and not pursuant to a request for assistance under the Ontario *PSA*. However, the RCMP's practice is to inform OPP of any such requests, given the OPP's role in providing assistance to municipal police services under the Ontario *PSA*. The RCMP did advise OPP in this instance.

2.4   Parliamentary Protective Services

33.   Parliamentary Protective Services (PPS) was established by statute in 2015 and is a separate and distinct organization from the RCMP.[18] PPS is responsible for the physical security of the Parliamentary Precinct, which includes the grounds of Parliament Hill.[19]

34.   While the law prescribes that the Director of the PPS must be a member of the RCMP, the Director executes their mandate under the joint general policy direction of the Speaker of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Commons.[20]

35.   PPS officers do not have peace officer status. They cannot charge people with *Criminal Code* offences. Instead, PPS will ordinarily call in the OPS to investigate and lay charges if and when necessary. The RCMP become involved in investigations in the Parliamentary Precinct only when the RCMP's national security or protective policing mandates are engaged.

36.   PPS has primary/exclusive jurisdiction with respect to physical security throughout the Parliamentary Precinct. The *Parliament of Canada Act* requires that the Speakers and the Minister of Public Safety enter into an arrangement to have the RCMP provide physical security services within the Parliamentary Precinct. There is no longer an RCMP presence within PPS, other than the requirement that the PPS Director must be an RCMP member.

---

[18] *Parliament of Canada Act*, RSC 1985, c P-1, s. 79.52
[19] PB.CAN.00001600_REL
[20] Parliamentary Protective Service, "The Service" (accessed 27 August 2022), online

2.5   National Capital Commission Conservation Officers

37.   The RCMP has entered into MOUs with the National Capital Commission (NCC), which sets out the terms on which the RCMP will grant NCC conservation officers peace officer status as supernumerary special constables under sections 9.6 and 11.1 of the *RCMP Act*.

38.   The NCC's conservation officers are not trained or authorized by the RCMP to conduct traffic enforcement. As a result, traffic enforcement (including response to motor vehicle collisions) is primarily an RCMP responsibility, performed for the NCC by the RCMP's National Capital Region Traffic Services on NCC and federal roadways, federal property, designated park lands and Gatineau Park in the NCR. NCC and federal roadways include seven major roads in Ottawa, two of the five inter-provincial bridges that span the Ottawa River,[21] and four major roads and three access roads in Gatineau Park.

3.   PROTESTS IN EARLY 2022 AND THE *EMERGENCIES ACT*

39.   Federal and provincial legislation provides police services with authorities and powers to maintain the rule of law. In January and February 2022, the RCMP was engaged in managing anti-COVID protocol protests and blockades across Canada in numerous communities where it was the POJ, in addition to its protective policing mandate discussed in section 1.1.2.

40.   Each location and blockade was different, with Ottawa presenting unique challenges. In Ottawa, OPS is the local POJ and the OPP is the provincial police force for Ontario. As such, the RCMP entered into a MOA with the Ottawa Police Services Board and the OPS (Ottawa MOA) on February 10. The Ottawa MOA articulated clearly each party's roles and responsibilities, and outlined cost-recovery.[22]

41.   The Ottawa MOA was required in part because, in order to enforce municipal and provincial laws in Ontario and Quebec, RCMP members must be designated as special

---

[21] The NCC has jurisdiction the Portage and Champlain bridges. Public Services and Procurement Canada has jurisdiction over the Chaudières, Alexandra, and MacDonald-Cartier bridges.
[22] PB.CAN.00000752_REL; PB.CAN.00000762_REL; PB.CAN.00000763_REL

constables under provincial law. The Ottawa MOA, and subsequent amendments, became the basis of the RCMP's assistance to OPS which helped clear the blockades in Ottawa in February.

42.   The RCMP consulted with other policing agencies of various jurisdictions during January and February in order to coordinate policing responses in accordance with the applicable command and control structures.

3.1   Consultations concerning the *Emergencies Act* between the RCMP and other federal departments, Ministers, and officials

3.1.1   *Consultations related to the invocation of the Emergencies Act*

43.   The RCMP Commissioner regularly briefed the Prime Minister, various Ministers, and senior officials in January and February, in particular February 10 to 22.

44.   Issues canvassed at the time of the Commissioner's briefings included:[23] ensuring the safety of the Prime Minister and protected Ministers; the illegal blockades; the situation in RCMP jurisdiction as well as in Ottawa; efforts to restore access to the Ambassador Bridge and other POEs; and the support that the RCMP was providing to law enforcement partners and local POJ.[24]

45.   The RCMP did not request the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*. The RCMP was asked what measures could be useful to law enforcement to resolve the situation, should the Government choose to invoke the *Emergencies Act*. After consultation with other law enforcement agencies, the Commissioner provided a list of such tools to the Minister of Public Safety, and other officials. These included:

- Stronger prohibitions against public assembly on roadways where those assemblies are expected to lead to a breach of the peace and the capacity to arrest and lay charges for breaches of such provisions;

---

[23] SSM.CAN.NSC.00002905_REL
[24] SSM.CAN.NSC.00002906_REL

- Prohibitions on the use of specified property to assist in a blockade. For example, making it an offence for individuals to bring gas or diesel fuel to fuel trucks participating in a blockade; and,

- Powers for police to deal with property, including authorities to commandeer heavy equipment (e.g. tow trucks) to remove obstacles such as trucks.

3.1.2   *Consultations related to the revocation of the Emergencies Act*

46.   As noted above, the RCMP regularly briefed the Prime Minister, various Ministers, and senior officials throughout January and February and provided regular situational awareness updates. The RCMP's primary concern was public and officer safety. Briefing areas in respect of the revocation of the *Act* included:

- The state of affairs on the ground in Ottawa and across Canada;

- The success of the law enforcement effort from February 18 – 21 to clear the blockade in Ottawa;

- Law enforcement actions being taken elsewhere to avoid further blockades; and

- Additional steps taken to maintain a secure perimeter and respond to any potential new illegal blockades.

3.2   *Emergency Economic Measures Order (EEMO)* **and** *Emergency Measures Regulations (EMRs)*

47.   The *EMRs* and *EEMO* were targeted in scope and did not affect the jurisdiction of any municipal or provincial policing agencies. Consistent with section 20 of the *Emergencies Act*, the RCMP did not assume responsibility as the POJ from OPS or any other police service in the NCR or anywhere else in Canada. Charts outlining the *EEMO* and the *EMRs* are included as Appendix I.

48.   The *EMRs* and *EEMO* did not create any new policing powers, aside from the authority to require persons to render essential goods and services to remove blockades and the authority to enforce provincial and municipal laws to ensure compliance with the *EMRs*. Rather, they

defined new offences related to participating in an unlawful blockade and created a duty on financial institutions to cease dealing with individuals engaged in such blockades.

49.   The new offences made clear the illegality of protesters continuing to block the streets of Ottawa (or beginning new blockades elsewhere in Canada). They also reduced the threat and risk level posed by the blockade by, for example, prohibiting bringing children to a volatile situation and by encouraging people to leave. The restrictions on funding and supplying blockades removed the logistical support that had enabled the blockades to continue for weeks. These new offences and powers helped the OPS, with support from the RCMP and other police partners, to defuse and ultimately remove the blockade peacefully.

50.   In terms of duration and geographic scope, the *EMRs* and *EEMO* were in effect for nine days and were relied on and used by the RCMP only to address the blockades in Ottawa. The RCMP and the Minister of Public Safety did not rely on their authorities under the *EMRs* and *EEMO* to direct persons to render essential goods and services, though the RCMP Commissioner delegated her authority to do so to the OPP. The OPP then made such directions in relation to the blockade in Ottawa. This is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.1 below.

3.2.1   EMRs and Tow Trucks

51.   Section 7(1) of the *EMRs* empowered the Commissioner of the RCMP or a person acting on her behalf to compel any person to make available and render any essential good or service requested for the removal, towing and storage of any vehicle, equipment, structure or other object that is part of a blockade.

52.   Prior to the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, there was no authority for a police service to requisition, for example, the services of a towing company. As such, prior to invocation, police services were unable to compel any cooperation from private towing companies.

53.   On February 17, the Commissioner of the RCMP authorized all Commanding Officers, Deputy Commissioners, Criminal Operations Officers, and RCMP members designated by them, to act on behalf of the Commissioner under section 7 of the *EMRs*. The Commissioner of the RCMP also authorized the OPP Commissioner and any OPP police officer designates to requisition essential goods and services under section 7.

54.   The *EMRs* allowed the OPP, pursuant to the OPP Commissioner's delegated authority, to compel tow truck companies or individuals to provide services that they would otherwise not provide. The Government of Canada was required to provide reasonable compensation at local market rates for the goods and services that were rendered pursuant to the *EMRs*.

3.2.2   EEMO and Financial Institutions

55.   Section 5 of the *EEMO* designated the Commissioner of the RCMP as one of two possible individuals to which entities had to report the existence of property in their possession or control, which they had reason to believe was owned, held or controlled by or on behalf of a designated person as well as any information about a transaction or proposed transaction in respect of that property.

56.   As such, on February 14, the RCMP commenced meetings with financial institutions. On February 15, RCMP established with the financial institutions' Corporate Security and Chief Anti-Money Laundering Officers, that the RCMP would be the liaison on behalf of all Canadian law enforcement when disclosing any *EEMO* information to financial institutions.

57.   The RCMP disclosed information to financial institutions in two streams. In the first stream, RCMP served as a channel of communication between the OPS and the OPP, and the financial institutions. Information disclosed by the OPS and the OPP consisted of names of individuals, dates of birth, residential addresses, open source, and related police information regarding their subjects of investigations in relation to their involvement in the blockade.

58.   In the second stream, the RCMP shared information with financial institutions about individuals associated to vehicles observed by the OPP as being involved in blockade activity in downtown Ottawa. The RCMP corroborated the presence of individuals and vehicles in the illegal protest observed by the OPP and shared identifying features[25] of these individuals and vehicles with financial institutions.

---

[25] This could include the name of the registered owner of an observed vehicle, the registered address on file for that owner or vehicle, or other information that the RCMP believed relevant to the application of the *EEMO* (e.g. social media posts that offered identification and potential last known location of an individual connected to a subject vehicle).

59.   At no time did the RCMP disclose any information on individuals who solely donated to the Convoys, or who purchased Convoy-related merchandise.

60.   The *EEMO* allowed the RCMP to proactively share basic personal information with entities listed in section 3 (e.g. banks, insurance companies, or crowd funding platforms) where the RCMP was satisfied that sharing would help in the implementation of the *EEMO*. Financial institutions had to exercise their own discretion in whether or not to freeze assets based upon the information provided. The RCMP did not freeze any assets of any individuals or businesses.

3.2.3   EEMO Timeline

61.   On February 16, 17, and 18, the RCMP met with Corporate Security and Chief Anti-Money Laundering Officers of financial institutions and commenced providing disclosures to financial institutions. Throughout, the RCMP notified financial institutions when the RCMP no longer believed that an entity the RCMP had disclosed information about was engaged in prohibited activities.[26]

62.   On February 17, financial institutions began freezing accounts linked to suspected illegal protest activity.

63.   On February 21, the RCMP issued a statement to the media addressing what information was shared by the RCMP to financial institutions, and confirming that no list of "donors" was provided to financial institutions.

64.   Also on February 21, the RCMP communicated with all financial institutions that had received disclosures from the RCMP and shared information about entities that the RCMP believed were no longer engaged in conduct prohibited under the *EMR*s and/or *EEMO*. This allowed financial institutions to take appropriate action in relation to assets they had frozen.[27]

65.   On February 22, the RCMP met with Corporate Security and Chief Anti-Money Laundering Officers of financial institutions and provided feedback on how the *EEMO* and *EMRs* had helped deter and disrupt the prohibited activities. The RCMP confirmed that law

---

[26] PB.NSC.CAN.00009559_REL at pages 1, 2, 3, and 5
[27] PB.CAN.00000772_REL

enforcement could not order financial institutions to unfreeze accounts, but that financial institutions could reassess any actions taken as a result of the information provided by police.[28]

66.   On February 23 when the Emergencies Act was revoked, the *EEMO* and *EMRs* ceased to apply. Financial institutions were no longer required to act according the *EEMO*.

67.   The RCMP was in regular contact with financial institutions on the use of the *EEMO* while the Act was in effect. The RCMP met virtually with financial institutions and other entities with reporting obligations under the *EEMOs* on February 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 22. The RCMP also met virtually with Virtual Currency Money Services Businesses on February 15, 18, and 24.[29]

68.   The following timeline of events covers the sharing of information to financial institutions:

- February 15: Cryptocurrency Alert #1 with 34 Bitcoin wallet addresses was disclosed to the Virtual Currency Money Service Businesses.
- February 16: 18 disclosures were provided by the RCMP to financial institutions.
- February 17: Cryptocurrency Alert #2 with 113 Bitcoin wallet addresses was disclosed to the Virtual Currency Money Service Businesses.
- February 17: 17 information disclosures provided by the RCMP to financial institutions.
- February 18: 21 disclosures provided by the RCMP to financial institutions.
- February 19: 1 disclosure provided by the RCMP to financial institutions.
- February 19: Cryptocurrency Alert #3 with 13 Bitcoin wallet addresses was disclosed to the Virtual Currency Money Service Businesses.
- February 22: shared 10 Bitcoin wallet addresses with virtual asset service providers.

69.   In total, by February 23, when the Act was repealed, the RCMP had disclosed:

- 57 entities to financial institutions, which included individuals and owners or drivers of vehicles involved in the blockades; and

---

[28] PB.NSC.CAN.00009559_REL at pages 6 and 7
[29] PB.NSC.CAN.00009559_REL at pages 1, 4, and 7

- 170 Bitcoin wallet addresses to virtual asset service providers.

70.   Financial institutions were not obligated to inform the RCMP of actions that they took within their own businesses. Therefore, the RCMP is not specifically aware of the number of products that financial institutions froze. That said, some financial institutions did provide information to the RCMP. That information indicated that financial institutions froze 257 financial products including, personal accounts, corporate accounts, and credit cards.

71.   The RCMP was not directly involved in either the freezing or unfreezing of accounts.

4.   RCMP'S ROLE IN THE NCR

72.   This section examines the National Capital Regional Command Centre (NCRCC), the Integrated Command Centre (ICC), and the Gold Silver Bronze (GSB) Command Structure, to explain roles and cooperation among police organizations in Ottawa during January and February 2022.

4.1   National Capital Regional Command Centre (NCRCC)

73.   The NCRCC is a secure operations centre that becomes operational during major events in the NCR requiring coordinated information sharing and planning between partner organizations. It is also the Divisional Emergency Operations Centre for the RCMP National Division.

74.   The NCRCC provides a functional space that can accommodate a variety of outside agencies and contains information technology capabilities that allow reviewing video, audio, live security footage and access to partner agency computer systems and information repositories from a variety of sources. The NCRCC also has geospatial capability that can prepare and update maps relevant to the reason for the activation of the NCRCC.

75.   Administrative and logistical support staff at the NCRCC have a wide range of duties, but are generally responsible for ensuring that operational and administrative needs of those attending at the NCRCC are met. One is a trained dispatcher who dispatches for protective policing operations while the NCRCC is active. This allows operational commanders and

coordinators to have a link to operational units. The NCRCC also has staff who monitor and update an information repository that includes information related to the diplomatic community in the NCR, including embassy and consulate locations, in addition to personnel.

76.   With respect to the Convoy, the NCRCC became operational on January 28. Through the next weeks, the NCRCC contained a unified command structure jointly operated by the OPS and RCMP, with the OPS leading as the POJ. Pursuant to the Ottawa MOA, the NCRCC was the central command structure for responding to the situation in Ottawa. This central command structure also included various stakeholders.[30]

77.   The NCRCC's work included coordination between member organizations, geospatial analysis, information technology support, and the processing and distribution of intelligence. The NCRCC held daily meetings in the morning to provide overviews of daily tasks and schedules as well as bi-hourly briefings.

78.   These tasks included logistical arrangements to ensure resources (such as food or transportation) were being provided where necessary. The NCRCC also distributed information with respect to the security status of designated officials requiring additional protective services.

79.   Throughout, the RCMP coordinated its assistance to OPS at the NCRCC, first as part of National Division, and then, from February 8 onward, as part of the stand alone "RCMP Ottawa Command: Assist OPS" (Assist OPS) command.

4.2   Integrated Command Centre (ICC)

80.   On February 12, the ICC was established as a working group between the RCMP, OPP, and OPS. The ICC was situated at RCMP headquarters. Through the ICC, law enforcement

---

[30]These stakeholders included: OPP, CSIS, PPS, OC Transpo, SQ, Gatineau Police, MRC des Collines Police, City of Ottawa, CAF, RCMP Intelligence Groups (Protective Intelligence Unit (PIU); Combined Intelligence Group (CIG); JIG; Federal Policing National Intelligence (FPNI); IMCIT, Technological Support and the American Embassy in addition to a multitude of RCMP units stationed in the NCR including all Protective Operations representatives from Prime Minister's Protective Detail, Very Important Person Protective Detail, Governor General Protective Detail, Protective Operations Response Unit, Emergency Response Team, Planning, Assessments and Protective Liaison Team, Tactical Support Group, Explosives Disposal Unit, Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive incidents (CBRNE) and Protective Policing .

partners assisted the OPS in developing and implementing an enforcement plan to respond peacefully to the blockade.

81.　　As with the NCRCC, the OPS had operational command of the ICC. Through the ICC, the OPS worked in a unified partnership with the RCMP and OPP and other law enforcement partners including the Toronto Police Service, York Regional Police, Sûreté du Québec (SQ), Gatineau Police, OC Transpo, and Peel Regional Police in developing the ICC enforcement plan. ICC planning was led by the Integrated Operational Planning Cell, under the direction of the ICC's unified command structure and Executive Steering Committee.

82.　　The ICC enforcement plan set out operational strategies designed to support OPS in deescalating and peacefully resolving the blockade.

83.　　The enforcement plan[31] provided guidance to police officers responding to the blockade relating to situational assessment, de-escalation, communication and reporting, arrest and processing, officer safety, and *Charter* compliance. The ICC also provided guidance and direction to officers regarding staging areas, developing a secure perimeter, removing vehicles and other obstructions and traffic control.

84.　　The ICC finalized the majority of the enforcement plan before the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, relying on pre-existing enforcement authorities. Planners also incorporated *Emergencies Act* authorities, such as collection of information related to entities suspected of being subject to the *EEMO*s, after the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*.

4.3　　GSB, ICC, and NCRCC Cooperation

85.　　The RCMP established its national GSB Command Structure, in part, to provide a framework for the RCMP's role in assisting OPS. Bronze Command Assist OPS operated out of the NCRCC. The NCRCC provided administrative and logistical support for all levels of the

---

[31] OPP00001873; OPP00002717; OPP00002718; OPP00002721; OPP00002719; OPP00002720; OPP00002709; OPP00002710; OPP00002711; OPP00002712; OPP00002713; OPP00002714; OPP00002930; OPP00002930; OPP00002715; PB.NSC.CAN.00007734; OPP00003594; PB.NSC.CAN.00007736_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007737_REL

national GSB, intelligence groups, and the ICC. As set out earlier, the ICC was an OPS-led operational working group where law enforcement partners including the RCMP, OPP, SQ and municipal law enforcement partners developed an enforcement plan which provided guidance and direction to resolve the situation in Ottawa safely and effectively.

86.   The NCRCC worked with and was not replaced by the ICC. The ICC was a unique structure established by the RCMP, the OPP, OPS on February 12 to accelerate planning. Through the ICC, the RCMP worked in partnership with the OPP and OPS, who had operational command, to develop and implement an enforcement plan to respond to the situation in Ottawa. The ICC's work resulted in the disruption of blockade activity, removal of the blockades in Ottawa, and the maintenance of public safety while doing so.

5.   RCMP INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

87.   The RCMP, as a law enforcement agency carrying out police duties, has broad authority to collect information. These duties range from investigating serious criminality to keeping the peace. This authority derives from the common law, as well as statutory law[32] to collect, use and disclose relevant information for criminal investigative purposes, as well as to preserve the peace and protect life.

88.   The RCMP collects information from a wide variety of sources including, but not limited to, police observations, statements from third parties (such as victims, witnesses or suspects), confidential informants, publicly available sources (social media, etc.), other law enforcement agencies, and judicial authorized searches and orders. This collected information only becomes "intelligence" after its validity, accuracy, and relevance have been properly assessed.

89.   Intelligence is information with context and meaning. Criminal intelligence anticipates emerging threats with nexus to crime in Canada and tracks trends. Within the context of policing a major event or emergency, collecting intelligence provides context to predictive modelling, response planning, and threat assessment.

---

[32] *RCMP Act*, s. 18; *RCMP Regulations*, s. 14(1)(a)

6.   GOLD SILVER BRONZE COMMAND SYSTEM

90.   In the face of a sudden event requiring a large and coordinated RCMP response, the RCMP may implement a Gold, Silver, Bronze (GSB) Command System.[33] The GSB Command System provides a framework for delivering a strategic, operational, and tactical response to a sudden incident or an operation. This is implemented for specific events or emergencies and is not a permanent structure. The GSB Command System allows processes to be established that facilitate the flow of information, and ensures that decisions are communicated effectively and documented.

91.   The GSB Command System can be used in conjunction with other command structures during its implementation. It does not replace other incident management systems.

6.1   Difference between Gold, Silver, and Bronze Command

92.   A GSB Command System consists of a Gold Command, a Silver Command, and any number of Bronze Commands. Reporting lines and accountability are based on roles, not rank. Information flows to and from Gold and Silver Command (as senior decision makers) to Bronze Commands and potentially other command structures such as, in the case of the blockades, the Integrated Command Centre for the National Capital Region (ICC).

93.   Gold Command sets strategic objectives for the operation, establishes tactical boundaries, has oversight and overall command responsibility. Gold Command is accountable for overall outcomes and assigns the Silver Commander. Gold Command ensures accurate messaging is prepared for government briefings.

94.   Silver Command takes the Gold Command's overall strategic objectives and creates an operational plan for Bronze Command to execute, taking into account relevant operational threats, vulnerabilities and risks. Silver Command designates and then coordinates directly with Bronze Command by providing guidance and direction on an "as needed" basis. Silver Command is also responsible for documenting any GSB directions or decisions, and

---

[33] PB.NSC.CAN.00009257_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00009521_REL

coordinating with other agencies regarding resource management before, during, and after, an incident or event.

95.   Bronze Commands can take on a variety of roles, including tactical, investigative and intelligence roles, as well as administrative, liaison, or corporate roles. Bronze Commands act in support of executing the strategic and operational plan dictated by Gold and Silver Command, respectively. Bronze Commands lead their own team within their designated roles.

6.2   The Use of GSB in Response to the Convoy

96.   The RCMP utilized GSB command structures in British Columbia and Alberta in response to border blockade in those jurisdictions.

97.   The RCMP's overall response to the Convoy and anti-mandate events across Canada was governed by a separate, national, GSB Command Structure, which became operational during the weekend of February 12. The national GSB Command Structure communicated with RCMP members in other regions in a series of teleconferencing meetings, referred to as "Daily Briefs", occurring twice per day from February 15 to February 22. Members designated by the GSB Command Structure from the divisions were present at these meetings to give and receive updates on the events within their areas of responsibility.

98.   The national GSB's overall roles included:

- mobilizing resources, as required, to execute operational plans;
- collecting, assessing, and developing intelligence and situational reporting on all relevant activities and persons to support operational planning;
- providing necessary logistical, financial, and administrative support to facilitate operations;
- liaising between the RCMP and other government departments and partners as needed for a coordinated response and clear messaging;
- communications, including media relations;
- labour relations, and officer health and safety; and

- establishing and maintaining standard operating procedures for managing resource or information requests, tasking, and decisions made under the auspices of the GSB.

6.3　National GSB Command Structure - Bronze Commands

99.　Various Bronze Commands operated as part of the national GSB Command Structure, including the following as outlined below. An organizational chart for the GSB structure throughout the NCR blockade is set out in Appendix II.

100.　Bronze Command – Assist OPS performed a number of roles and was stationed within the NCRCC. Assist OPS was a stand alone command created in early February to consolidate the RCMP's assistance to OPS in relation to the ongoing protests. After establishment of the national GSB, the lead of Assist OPS became the Bronze Command: Assist OPS. The Bronze Command received direction from the RCMP's Gold and Silver Command and then liaised with RCMP partners stationed at NCRCC. Based on directions from Gold and Silver Command, Bronze Command instructed the Operations Officer in Charge within the NCRCC, who would relay those instructions to duty inspectors, shift supervisors, Quick Response Team (QRT) coordinators, and the relevant operational support members

101.　Bronze Command – National Mobilization served as the primary point of contact for all resource mobilization efforts. It coordinated resourcing to support efforts to maintain public order, control traffic, logistics, and providing tactical support to RCMP partners such as OPS. It also reported and communicated resourcing needs both within GSB and with the Unified Command, a command within the NCRCC with the RCMP, OPP, and OPS, to ensure resourcing effort met evolving operational needs on the ground.

102.　Bronze Command – Government Coordination acted as the primary point of contact between the RCMP and members of Parliament. It provided responses to Ministers and other government officials requesting information for Parliamentary appearances, Question Period, and general awareness. GSB also included designated Bronze Commands for liaison with Public Safety and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

103.   As Canada's national law enforcement agency, the RCMP has a duty to detect, prevent and respond to national security-related criminal threats in Canada. Federal Policing National Security is a team within the RCMP, located in Ottawa, which provides oversight, direction and guidance to RCMP members nationally regarding work relating to national security.

104.   During the blockade, Federal Policing National Security acted as Bronze Command – Federal Policing Investigations – National Security, the primary point of contact for the National Security program. Functionally, the Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team (IMCIT), discussed in section 6.6.4, would identify tactical leads or intelligence to Federal Policing National Security for awareness and further distribution within the GSB command structure.

105.   Bronze Command – International acted as a primary national level point of contact for information sharing – inbound and outbound – with international law enforcement partners about the illegal protest activity.

106.   Bronze Command – ATIP was responsible for requests received by the RCMP pursuant to the Access to Information Act.

107.   The GSB held briefing meetings twice daily via teleconference with designated members from regional Divisions. At these meetings, members in the National Capital Region (NCR) shared and received status updates with RCMP members outside the NCR with respect to the Convoy and blockades across Canada.

6.4   Communication Structures

108.   As per the GSB system discussed in section 6.1, information would flow from Gold or Silver Commanders based on their awareness of the evolving situation and communication with other partners within the ICC. This information would then be disseminated to the relevant Bronze Commander. Each Bronze Command would have a similar structure, modified based on their needs regarding the dissemination of information.

109.   For example, the Bronze Commander responsible for Assist OPS would receive direction from the Gold/Silver Commander and then liaise with his partners within NCRCC where he was

stationed. The Bronze Commander would, in turn, provide information down to the NCRCC Operations Officer in Charge, who would then relay it to:

- Duty Inspectors;
- Shift Supervisors;
- QRT Coordinators; and,
- Operational Support members who required it.

110. For front line duties, most commonly, the Shift Supervisor or QRT Coordinator would then brief each shift before they were deployed to those duties.

111. As above, Bronze Command – National Communications coordinated communications efforts, which included media relations, responding to requests for information, providing regular briefing updates to the GSB structure, and providing unclassified situational awareness reports to partner organizations. Bronze Command – National Communications met twice daily to report on developments and arising issues, and to coordinate regarding resource needs.

6.5   Liaising with Other Partners

112. A number of Bronze Commands served as the primary points of contact for the RCMP's partners during the blockade. As noted earlier, Bronze Commands for Government Coordination and National Communications, as well as Bronze Commands for Public Safety Government of Canada Liaison and CAF Liaison liaised with RCMP partners within the structure of the Federal Government. These roles involved coordinating efforts on behalf of the partner organization, responding to any requests for information, providing regular updates to the GSB structures and assisting during any efforts that may require assistance from that partner. These Bronze Commands were supplementary to existing mechanisms and processes that existed between the RCMP and each respective partner.

113. Bronze Command Assist OPS deployed RCMP resources to OPS pursuant to both the Ottawa MOA and, later, authorities arising from the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*. In particular, Assist OPS oversaw the deployment of personnel in response to OPS requests for assistance with traffic control points, QRTs, Rapid Response Teams, prisoner escorts, perimeter maintenance, arrest and processing, and administrative, operational and logistics tasks.

6.6   RCMP Intelligence Groups

114.   There were four groups that were responsible for specific aspects of the intelligence picture that helped to guide the RCMP's operational response to Convoy-related events at a national level and in the NCR:

- the Protective Intelligence Unit;
- the Combined Intelligence Group;
- the Federal Policing GSB Joint Intelligence Group (Joint Intelligence Group); and,
- the Federal Policing National Intelligence and the Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team (IMCIT).

115.   Each group's specific role is outlined below. The RCMP also received information as a result of its participation in the OPP-led Project Hendon, which is discussed in section 6.6.5.

6.6.1   Protective Intelligence Unit

116.   The Protective Intelligence Unit is composed of RCMP intelligence officers and intelligence analysts who produce operational, tactical, and/or strategic intelligence reports to assist investigations and operations relating to the RCMP's protective operations mandate to protect the Prime Minister, Supreme and Federal Court Justices, international protected persons, and other designated protected persons.

117.   When the NCRCC is activated, the Protective Intelligence Unit provides intelligence support to the NCRCC. Prior to the arrival of the Convoy in the NCR, the Protective Intelligence Unit briefed protective policing units and external stakeholders with respect to the evolution of the various protests and demonstrations across Canada relating to the Government's COVID-19 response and other public health measures. The Protective Intelligence Unit also provided information relating to the development and planning of the Freedom Convoy, including crowdfunding efforts, social media discussion regarding the planned Freedom Convoy, and its organizers.

118.   Between January 28 and February 24, the Protective Intelligence Unit led a separate and distinct Combined Intelligence Group to ensure timely sharing of information and intelligence between NCRCC stakeholders that is discussed below in section 6.6.2. During this period, the

Protective Intelligence Unit produced intelligence bulletins containing information sourced from within the RCMP, other law enforcement agencies, open source information (such as social media), and information shared at NCRCC briefings. The Protective Intelligence Unit provided these bulletins hourly on a 'need-to-know' basis to applicable RCMP units and other law enforcement agencies. After the third week of the protests, Protective Intelligence Unit began producing these bulletins every two hours. The bulletins provided information and intelligence relevant to operational planning, ongoing risk assessment, and identifying trends with respect to the ongoing blockade.

6.6.2   Combined Intelligence Group

119.   Led by the Protective Intelligence Unit, the Combined Intelligence Group conducted intelligence gathering and research in support of the NCRCC and the RCMP's protective operations and national security mandates during the period of the Convoy-related protests and blockades. The Combined Intelligence Group received information from various law enforcement intelligence partners including OPS, Gatineau Police, CBSA, and the OPP. The Combined Intelligence Group then processed that information into intelligence reports for the NCRCC and ICC specific to the blockades between January 28 and February 27.

120.   The Combined Intelligence Group provided information regarding reports of violence such as attempted arson in apartment buildings, assaults, reports and concerns regarding the possible presence of firearms within the blockades, public nuisance, harassment, counter-protests, threats to tow truck companies, and potential bomb threats.

121.   The Combined Intelligence Group also provided intelligence regarding tactics used by blockade participants, such as noise pollution (blowing truck horns at regular intervals), fuel stockpiling, counter-surveillance by blockade members, and techniques designed to make trucks difficult to remove (such as removing tires).

122.   The Combined Intelligence Group also compiled reports regarding social media posts, including threats against public officials, Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) rhetoric, counter-protests, misinformation and propaganda, and instructions to occupiers from organizers or social influencers.

6.6.3   GSB Joint Intelligence Group

123.   The national GSB Command Structure established its own intelligence team, the Joint Intelligence Group, as the primary point of contact and coordinating body for all national level situational awareness and operational intelligence sharing. The Joint Intelligence Group became operational on February 12 and reported on events across Canada, including those impacting critical infrastructure, violent incidents, and blockades at various POEs, to the national GSB Command Structure.

124.   Between February 14 and 27, the Joint Intelligence Group provided situational update briefings on all protest activity nationwide, including potential threats to law enforcement personnel. These reports included information from the Protective Intelligence Unit and the Combined Intelligence Group, RCMP Divisional Reporting, open source material, and RCMP and law enforcement databases.

6.6.4   Ideologically Motivated Criminal Intelligence Team

125.   Federal Policing National Intelligence runs IMCIT, which provides intelligence reports and information on ideologically motivated actors and networks that may pose criminal threats to public order and safety. IMCIT identifies ideologically motivated threats detected online and notifies the applicable POJ. IMCIT also studies emerging ideologically motivated networks and groups who are suspected of posing a criminal threat. Prior to and during public order events where ideological motivations are present or suspected, IMCIT provides strategic threat advisories to the responding police agencies.

126.   IMCIT gathers intelligence by consulting reports and intelligence from other RCMP sources, and conducting open source scans of traditional media, social media, and other online platforms. In particular, IMCIT focuses on criminal threats to public safety, officer safety (including doxing[34]), threats to elections, and emerging trends within ideologically motivated networks both domestically and internationally.

---

[34] Doxing is the act of searching for and publicly revealing private or identifying information about an individual or organization, usually via the internet.

127.   The IMCIT assessments referenced below were disseminated within the RCMP, as well as to external partners in Privy Council Office, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Transport Canada, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, Communications Security Establishment, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Public Safety, CBSA, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), and the Government Operations Centre.

128.   Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, IMCIT has reported on various public order events including anti-lockdown or anti-mask protests, blockade events and criminal threats to the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, such as threats towards front-line workers and public officials. This reporting grew in frequency through 2021, as elaborated on in section 7.1.1.

129.   With respect to the blockade in the NCR, IMCIT produced eight situational threat assessments tracking the Freedom Convoy between January 26 and February 23. These assessments provided intelligence regarding:

- routes taken by trucks nationwide to Ottawa;
- events and activities in "solidarity" with the Freedom Convoy;
- crowdfunding campaigns and the progress of those campaigns;
- traffic and public order disruptions;
- unlawful activities;
- the suspected intent of protesters, blockaders and occupiers;
- the suspected presence of ideologically motivated elements and symbols in Ottawa, including;
  - Nazi and Confederate symbolism;
  - Symbolism linked to other ideologically motivated groups such as Diagolon, Canada First, the Kingdom of Canada, and Three Percenters;
- individuals with former law enforcement or military experience providing logistical or security advice to occupiers and blockaders; and
- the effect of enforcement actions both before and after the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*.

6.6.5   Project Hendon

130.   In February 2020, the OPP began "Project Hendon". Project Hendon is an OPP-led forum for collecting and sharing criminal intelligence relating to public order and safety within Ontario. The project focuses on public order events that have the potential to attract ideologically motivated actors or extremists.

131.   In January and February 2022, the RCMP received reports and information from OPP through Project Hendon relevant to Convoy-related protests. These reports were received by various RCMP partners within National Headquarters and divisions nationwide.

7.   THE RCMP AND THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGIONAL RESPONSE

132.   This section will provide a detailed examination of the RCMP's involvement with the Convoy, prior to its arrival, during its blockade in Ottawa, and after it dispersed.

7.1   Timeline of RCMP Activities in the NCR

7.1.1   Prior to January 28, 2022

133.   As part of its national security and protective policing mandates, the RCMP had been aware of demonstrations and sentiments opposed to public health measures, vaccines or masking during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

134.   Throughout 2021, the RCMP gathered and reported information with respect to possible security risks arising from protests and demonstrations related to the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These reports indicated that these protests were generally peaceful in nature, but contained a number of possible risks including emboldening ethno-nationalists[35] and other ideologically motivated elements, vandalism,[36] disruption to political events,[37] and conflict between protesters and counter-protesters.[38]

---

[35] PB.NSC.CAN.00000509_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000510_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000511_REL
[36] PB.NSC.CAN.00000509_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000510_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000511_REL
[37] PB.NSC.CAN.00000500_REL, pages 2-3
[38] PB.NSC.CAN.00000501_REL, page 2

135.   The RCMP noted unique challenges to information gathering and enforcement with respect to these events because much of the organization and communication occurred on anonymous online platforms. The decentralized and often spontaneous nature of many of the demonstrations also complicated investigation and information gathering.[39]

136.   As late as September 2021, the RCMP noted security concerns relating to the growing presence of conspiracy theorists, extremist groups, and militia presence at these events.[40] These elements created a developing risk to public safety and officer safety.[41] In late 2021, the RCMP reported growing concern about the risk of violence during protest events, particularly with respect to demonstrations targeting politicians, members of the media, vaccine clinics, airports or special events.[42]

137.   In December 2021, the RCMP maintained situational awareness of - and reported on - a number of demonstrations in the NCR. These events took place between December 6 and 10, causing some minor traffic disruptions in the areas where the events took place.[43] As these protests occurred outside the RCMP's jurisdiction, any issues arising from them would have been addressed by the POJ.

138.   On January 15, the RCMP became aware of a GoFundMe page raising funds for the 'Freedom Convoy 2022'.

139.   On January 18, the RCMP reported that social media discussion indicated truckers and supporters intended to converge in Ottawa and block Parliament Hill.[44]

140.   On January 21, the RCMP updated its ministerial security plans with respect to its protective policing mandate. These updates were made, in part, due to concerns arising from anti-public health order rhetoric and demonstrations at the residences of public officials.[45]

---

[39] PB.NSC.CAN.00000527_REL
[40] PB.NSC.CAN.00000502_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000503_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000504_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000505_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000506_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000507_REL
[41] PB.NSC.CAN.00000512_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000513_REL
[42] PB.NSC.CAN.00000514_REL, pages 6-7; PB.NSC.CAN.00000515_REL
[43] PB.NSC.CAN.00008056_REL
[44] PB.NSC.CAN.00008056_REL
[45] PB.NSC.CAN.00000577_REL

141. On January 25, IMCIT issued a special threat advisory regarding an escalation in online rhetoric opposing public health restrictions. The report noted growing opposition to public health orders and a risk of protest actions designed to pressure federal and provincial governments to reverse public health measures.[46]

142. On January 26, IMCIT updated its advisory to include information about "a national event entitled 'Freedom Convoy 2022'." At that time, it was uncertain as to how many individuals or vehicles would participate in the event. The advisory also noted "limited information" regarding the group's actual intentions or how long the event was likely to last. The advisory indicated likely traffic disruptions and highlighted the increasingly violent or extremist rhetoric appearing online "within anti-public health order narratives."[47] In addition, IMCIT warned that some participants appeared to be planning for a longer stay in Ottawa and raised concerns that the event could become a flashpoint for violence.

143. Also on January 26, INTERSECT (a pre-existing multijurisdictional emergency preparedness program co-chaired by OPS, the RCMP and City of Gatineau) met with respect to the Convoy. The RCMP placed tactical members on standby at Rideau Hall as part of its protective policing mandate. TSG units were also put on standby. The RCMP also shared information and coordinated with PPS and Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Commons regarding any requests for assistance in ensuring security for Parliamentarians or over the Parliamentary Precinct. The RCMP also engaged with the Office of Protocol within GAC regarding concerns from the international diplomatic community located in Ottawa.[48]

144. On January 27, IMCIT produced another intelligence update regarding the Convoy. While it was still unclear at that time how large the Convoy actually was, the advisory noted that the OPP believed approximately 551 vehicles (including both trucks and passenger vehicles) were driving towards Ottawa for the event. In addition, plans for a number of 'solidarity' events scheduled to take place in various cities across Canada were also reported.[49] IMCIT also developed a national strategic assessment, which included reporting on the Convoy. This

---

[46] PB.NSC.CAN.00000527_REL
[47] PB.NSC.CAN.00000521_REL
[48] PB.NSC.CAN.00008070_REL
[49] PB.NSC.CAN.00000522_REL

assessment discussed the growing risks associated with protests outside the residences of public officials and the Convoy.[50]

145. The RCMP collaborated with other law enforcement agencies, including the OPP, OPS, Gatineau Police, SQ, and PPS as the Convoy approached Ottawa. On January 27, a decision was made to activate the NCRCC on January 28.[51]

7.1.2 January 28 to February 3, 2022

146. On January 28, Convoy vehicles began entering the NCR. At that time, there were no reliable estimates regarding the number of protesters or vehicles that had arrived or were expected to arrive in the coming days. In turn, the OPP reported approximately 1352 'Convoy' vehicles within Ontario. Similarly, IMCIT reported a lack of reliable information regarding the duration of the event, routes, or protest areas. IMCIT also noted initial reports of heavy machinery being transported to Ottawa, and advised that these devices could be used to obstruct areas.[52]

147. Concurrently, Ontario RCMP (O Division) received information that an individual with allegedly extremist views intended to attend the blockades while armed. The RCMP worked with OPP to identify this individual and OPP later questioned this individual on February 6.[53]

148. On January 31, Protective Policing Services began escorting and providing close protection for VIPs and Ministers that requested it.

149. On February 2, the RCMP received a request for assistance from OPS. By February 4, RCMP members had begun providing support to OPS.[54]

7.1.3 February 4 to February 13, 2022

---

[50] PB.NSC.CAN.00000499_REL
[51] PB.NSC.CAN.00000577_REL
[52] PB.NSC.CAN.00000523_REL
[53] PB.NSC.CAN.00009558_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000104_REL
[54] PB.CAN.00000751_REL

150.   Throughout February 4-13, the RCMP continued to provide support to OPS. The RCMP also received or reported on a number of tips and rumours related to the risk of violence during the blockade. The RCMP looked into open source information related to possible distribution of firearms to protesters,[55] threats toward public officials, and bomb threats.[56] OPS also advised the RCMP about their investigation into attempted arson at an apartment complex, attributed at the time (though later disproven), to an unknown member of the Convoy.[57] The RCMP also reported on tactics employed by blockaders, including obstructing the entrances to buildings, counter-surveillance via drone cameras, and disabling trucks to prevent their removal.

151.   On February 6, the Mayor of Ottawa declared a state of emergency in Ottawa.

152.   On February 7, the RCMP began transitioning operational command of its support to OPS from National Division to a stand alone command, called Assist OPS. This transition was completed on February 8. As discussed in sections 4.1, 4.3, and 6.3, the lead for Assist OPS became Bronze Command Assist OPS, once the national GSB structure became active. The following types of RCMP personnel were deployed:

- Public Servants/Administration;
- Uniformed General Duty;
- Traffic Control Points;
- QRT, Vehicle-Mobile;
- Rapid Response Teams, Foot-Mobile;
- Prisoner Escort Teams;
- Maintenance Plan-Perimeter;
- Command Element (arrest and processing, Operations, Logistics, Mobilization);
- TSG; and
- Emergency Response Team.

153.   In addition, members of RCMP Protective Policing were deployed to enhance protection, detection and response capability:

---

[55] PB.NSC.CAN.00009560_REL
[56] PB.NSC.CAN.00009560_REL
[57] PB.NSC.CAN.00000108_REL

- Enhanced Ministerial Transport/Escorts;
- Enhanced Supreme Court Justices Escorts; and,
- Protective Policing Response Unit.[58]

154.   On February 10, the RCMP and OPS signed the Ottawa MOA which called for an additional 250 RCMP members to be in Ottawa to assist OPS. Under the Ottawa MOA, OPS were in operational command of RCMP members during their deployment.[59] Subsequent amendments to the Ottawa MOA extended the duration of the initial request and increased the number of deployed RCMP Members.[60]

155.   On February 11, the Premier of Ontario declared a state of emergency in Ontario. During the weekend of February 12, as noted above, the RCMP activated the national GSB command structure. Concurrently, the ICC was established and the Joint Intelligence Group became operational. Through the ICC, the RCMP worked in partnership with OPS (who retained operational command), and OPP to develop and implement an enforcement plan to respond to the situation in Ottawa.

7.1.4   February 14 to February 23, 2022

156.   On February 14, the Governor in Council declared a public order emergency pursuant to subsection 17(1) of the *Emergencies Act*. The RCMP's powers and authorities under the *EMR* and *EEMO* are summarized in section 3.2 of this report.

157.   Following the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, RCMP deployments in the NCR increased from approximately 500 to 1000 members. Additionally, the RCMP secured resources by entering into separate MOAs with the Vancouver Police Department, Edmonton Police Service, Saskatoon Police Service,[61] and Regina Police Service[62] to support the RCMP's assistance to OPS.

---

[58] PB.NSC.CAN.00000538_REL
[59] PB.CAN.00000752_REL
[60] PB.CAN.00000762_REL; PB.CAN.00000763_REL
[61] PB.NSC.CAN.00009561_REL
[62] PB.CAN.00000767_REL

158.   Throughout, the RCMP continued to receive direction from OPS as POJ for matters outside of the RCMP federal mandate.

159.   In addition to the powers discussed in section 3.2, the EMRs also supplemented existing authorities and provided new instruments for law enforcement to address illegal blockades in particular. For example, police were able to maintain a secure perimeter throughout the NCR and refuse entry to individuals travelling to the illegal protest with the intent of participating. Additionally, supporting an illegal assembly was also prohibited, and police had the enforcement authority to arrest individuals who continued to supply fuel, food, and other materials to an area of unlawful assembly.

160.   These temporary authorities also provided RCMP officers with arrest authorities for provincial and municipal bylaws. The *EMRs* provided further and immediate consequences for those participating in the unlawful protests, and in turn encouraged individuals to leave and cease the unlawful activity, and deterred others from planning to attend.

161.   On February 17, the RCMP formally delegated its authorities to compel the production of goods and services to OPP under subsection 7(1).[63] In addition, OPS directed the erection of fences in front of government buildings, including Parliament Hill and the Senate of Canada Building. The RCMP assisted with this effort under OPS direction.[64]

162.   On February 18, the ICC established a Secured Area in downtown Ottawa and restricted access to a number of roads in the NCR. The RCMP's authorities under the EMRs allowed the RCMP to assist OPS in maintaining a secure perimeter in downtown Ottawa. The RCMP cannot confirm the number of RCMP officers that may have been involved in establishing and maintaining a fence perimeter. OPS was the POJ in the NCR, and any assistance provided by the RCMP would have been the result of RCMP officers following orders as part of Bronze Command Assist OPS.

163.   On February 18, an RCMP TSG also assisted with the arrest and clearing of the blockade in the NCR. Any arrests made by the RCMP were made under *Criminal Code* authorities. A TSG member completed the initial arrest of the individual for the observed offence and then handed

---

[63] PB.CAN.00000760_REL
[64] PB.NSC.CAN.00000567_REL

them over to the OPS for processing. OPS holds the most comprehensive information on all action undertaken by the integrated team implementing the Enforcement Plan.

164. On February 23, the declaration of the public order emergency under the *Emergencies Act* was revoked.

7.1.5 *After February 23, 2022*

165. Following the revocation of the EMRs and EEMO, the RCMP continued to assist OPS in maintaining order in the NCR. This included reporting information regarding possible staging areas where protesters, having left Ottawa, were regrouping. Police maintained situational awareness of these areas and liaised with the protesters to ensure they were not returning to Ottawa for unlawful purposes.[65] The Combined Intelligence Group continued to report on social media and other open source information with respect to concerns about protesters or occupiers returning to Ottawa.[66]

166. On February 24, the City of Ottawa began its 'demobilization' phase, which included modifying traffic management plans and other protocol in light of the decrease in demonstration activities.[67]

167. On February 28, the RCMP disbanded Bronze Command Assist OPS, transferring operational command of RCMP assistance to OPS back to RCMP National Division. On March 2, RCMP assistance to the OPS related to protests ceased.

7.2 General – Protective Policing for diplomatic community

---

[65] PB.NSC.CAN.00000289_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000296_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000302_REL
[66] PB.NSC.CAN.00000311_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000312_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000317_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000323_REL, as an example
[67] PB.NSC.CAN.00000296_REL, page 3

168. As part of the RCMP's protective policing mandate, the RCMP works with the Diplomatic Security Services within the Office of Protocol in GAC to ensure the safety for diplomatic missions and accredited personnel.

169. During the blockade in the NCR, the RCMP liaised with Diplomatic Security Services and GAC with respect to:

- Providing security information updates; and
- Addressing calls/complaints from individuals in the diplomatic community, including assessing any risk to embassies, missions, and consulates.

8. <u>RESPONSE TO THE BLOCKADE AT COUTTS, ALBERTA</u>

170. The Convoy manifested in protests and other public order events taking place nation-wide, and the RCMP was involved in responding to these protests and events in divisions across the country. The following sections depict the most significant blockades and protests which occurred K Division (Alberta), E Division (British Columbia), O Division (Ontario), and D Division (Manitoba). These four divisions required the most significant RCMP response.

8.1 K Division

171. K Division is the RCMP's second largest division. The RCMP are the POJ for most of Alberta, except where municipalities have incorporated their own police service.[68]

172. Prior to the commencement of the blockade north of the Canada-USA border crossing in Coutts, AB (Coutts POE), K Division reported on protests and demonstrations relating to public health measures.[69] The RCMP gathered intelligence with respect to these events and prepared operational responses on an as needed basis.

8.2 RCMP's role in Alberta in response to the blockade at Coutts, AB

---

[68] Calgary, Camrose, Edmonton, Lacombe, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, and Taber
[69] PB.NSC.CAN.00008327_REL

8.2.1 Command Structure

173.   On January 29, "GSB - K Division" became operational with respect to the RCMP's response to the blockade at the Coutts POE. The GSB command structure set up in K Division is distinct from the National GSB structure.[70] In K Division, a Bronze Command – Coordinated Conflict Management (CCMB) unit was in operation, whose responsibilities included mediating and conflict management with individuals involved in the blockade.

174.   Bronze Command – Integrated Border Enforcement liaised with CBSA officials and investigated matters relating to unauthorized border crossing. Other Bronze Commands addressed issues including traffic management, air-space control, logistics intelligence gathering, media relations and communication with the Government of Alberta, including daily situation reports.[71]

175.   Members of K Division GSB met regularly with RCMP members and other stakeholders in other districts in Alberta where the RCMP is the POJ to provide updates with respect to the response to the Coutts Blockade. In turn, K Division also provided regular updates during National Headquarters GSB daily briefings.

8.2.2 The Coutts Blockade

176.   On January 29, a number of vehicles blockaded Highway 4, the main highway leading to and from the Coutts POE. The Port of Coutts is the largest, and only, 24-hour, POE in Alberta. That same date, K Division activated the Alberta Division Emergency Operations Centre and developed an initial deployment plan.[72]

177.   On January 30, the RCMP, CBSA, and US Customs and Border Protection formed a coordination group which became the Coutts Coordination Group. This coordination discussed

---

[70] PB.NSC.CAN.00008732_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008733_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008736_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008737_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008738_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008739_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008740_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008741_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008742_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008743_REL
[71] PB.NSC.CAN.00007658_REL
[72] The Alberta Division Emergency Operations Centre is managed by the Operational Readiness and Response (ORR) unit and is a self-contained room within K Division Headquarters.

options and strategies regarding alleviating pressure on the Coutts POE. In addition, on that day, the RCMP noted that some blockaders were no longer responding to the "organizers" and that other more aggressive splinter factions were developing within the blockade.

178.   On January 31, the CCMB contacted the organizers of the blockade. RCMP members communicated with organizers through the day, but could not reach an agreement ending the blockade. The RCMP continued to attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the blockade throughout its duration.

179.   That same date, the Coutts Coordination Group began executing a plan to escort approximately 30 semi-trucks stuck north of the border due to the blockade.

180.   On February 1, RCMP members intended to take enforcement action and remove the blockading vehicles. However, local tow truck companies withdrew their assistance prior to enforcement due to concerns arising from negative attention and commentary on social media. For instance, the Protective Intelligence Unit (from the NCR) reported that one or more individuals on social media were instructing others to boycott a tow truck company rumored to be assisting the RCMP. The RCMP also received information that some blockade members or their supporters were paying tow truck companies not to assist RCMP enforcement activities.

181.   Between February 1 and 2, K Division reached out to over 80 different tow truck companies in Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan for assistance. No company contacted by the RCMP would agree to assist the RCMP in any enforcement actions.

182.   The RCMP engaged with CBSA to allow the entry of foreign tow trucks from the US, and reached out to over 25 American tow truck companies. The American companies also refused to assist.

183.   On February 2, discussions between RCMP members and the blockaders resulted in the blockaders agreeing to open up one northbound and one southbound land on Highway 4.

184.   Also on February 2, the Commanding Officer of K-Division wrote to the Acting Minister of Justice and Solicitor General of Alberta, requesting that Alberta invoke Article 9.1 of the Provincial and Municipal Police Services Agreements, authorizing the redeployment of RCMP officers assigned to specific municipalities to the Coutts POE blockade.

185.   On February 3, RCMP members attempted to escort four commercial vehicles from a checkpoint to the Coutts POE. The blockaders responded by moving vehicles to completely shut down a stretch of Highway 4.[73]

186.   On February 4, K Division submitted a request for CAF equipment (tow trucks) and personnel to RCMP Headquarters. In addition, on February 5, the Government of Alberta wrote a letter to the Minister of Public Safety and Minister of Emergency Preparedness requesting federal assistance including the provision of equipment and personnel to move approximately 70 vehicles and 75 passenger vehicles from the area.[74]

187.   On February 8, the Government of Alberta announced plans to lift certain provincial public health mandates. After the Premier's announcement, blockaders again realigned their vehicles and farm equipment to completely block the Coutts POE.[75]

188.   On February 11, RCMP members obtained a judicial authorization to advance an ongoing investigation. This resulted in the issuance of a search warrant on February 13, authorizing searches of various trailers and property forming part of the blockade.[76]

189.   On February 12, at the RCMP's request, in order to preserve public safety, CBSA suspended all its activities at the Coutts POE.[77]

190.   On February 13, the Province of Alberta informed the RCMP that it was in the process of procuring six tow trucks for use at the Coutts POE.[78]

191.   On February 14, the RCMP executed the above-noted search warrant. The search resulted in the seizure of 13 long guns, handguns, multiple sets of body armour, a machete, a large quantity of ammunition, and high capacity magazines. Some seized body armour featured patches for the extremist group Diagolon. These seizures led to a total of 13 arrests resulting in

---

[73] PB.NSC.CAN.00007340_REL
[74] PB.NSC.CAN.00001578_REL
[75] PB.NSC.CAN.00000569_REL
[76] PB.NSC.CAN.00008731
[77] PB.NSC.CAN.00001103_REL
[78] PB.NSC.CAN.00009563_REL

charges including conspiracy to murder, possession of a weapon, mischief over $5000, and uttering threats.[79] These matters remain before the Court.

192.   On the same day, a large farm tractor and semi-truck attempted, unsuccessfully, to ram a police vehicle. In addition, the Province of Alberta authorized the deployment of RCMP members who were otherwise assigned to a specific municipality to be reassigned to assist with enforcement at Coutts.[80] The RCMP also corresponded with municipal policing services to request assistance.[81]

193.   As of 7:00pm on February 14, the RCMP reached an agreement with the blockaders, who promised to dismantle the blockade and disperse on February 15.

194.   On February 15, the blockade dispersed peacefully and the Coutts POE reopened.[82] The Alberta Minister of Transport set up an alternate protest site in Milk River.[83] While events continued north of the Coutts POE and at the Milk River site, no further attempts to blockade the highway occurred.[84]

195.   During the invocation of the *Emergencies Act*, RCMP members distributed pamphlets to protesters advising them of their rights and obligations during the period where the *EMRs* and *EEMO* were in force.[85]

8.2.3   *Other Activities – Alberta*

---

[79] PB.NSC.CAN.00000555_REL
[80] For example PB.NSC.CAN.00003456_REL. See also: PB.NSC.CAN.00007273_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007274_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007275_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007276_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007277_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007278_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007279_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007280_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007281_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007282_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007283_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007284_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007285_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007286_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007287_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007288_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007289_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00007290_REL
[81] PB.NSC.CAN.00008326_REL
[82] PB.NSC.CAN.000003709_REL
[83] PB.NSC.CAN.00000171_REL, page 5; PB.NSC.CAN.00000313_REL, page 3
[84] PB.NSC.CAN.00005770_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008600_REL
[85] PB.NSC.CAN.00008361_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008362_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008363_REL

196.   From February 1 to 10, at least seven solidarity protests took place in Airdrie, Calgary, Cochrane, Edmonton, Lethbridge, and Okotoks.[86] This resulted in one arrest for assault in central Alberta and the issuance of a number of tickets by Calgary Police Service.

197.   On February 14, the RCMP entered into an MOA with Edmonton Police Service to provide assistance supporting OPS in the NCR.[87]

198.   On February 15, the RCMP became aware of plans to organize a convoy protest to the Alberta Legislature Building on February 22 to protest the Throne Speech.[88] During the afternoon of February 22, approximately 225 vehicles and 1500 pedestrians participated in this demonstration. As POJ, Edmonton Police Services issued tickets for 109 violations during this event.[89]

9.   RESPONSE TO CONVOY-RELATED PROTESTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

9.1   E Division

199.   E Division is the RCMP's largest division. In British Columbia, the RCMP provides police services to 72% of BC's population, covering 99% of the province's geographic area. This includes 144 RCMP detachments in 150 municipalities, and over 200 Indigenous communities, many of which are located in rural and remote areas.[90]

200.   E Division divides the province into four different geographical districts or regions - Lower Mainland District, Vancouver Island District, South East District, and North District.

9.2   RCMP's role in British Columbia

9.2.1   Command Structure and Contingency Planning

---

[86] PB.NSC.CAN.00000526_REL, page 6
[87] PB.NSC.CAN.00000325_REL
[88] PB.NSC.CAN.00000163_REL
[89] PB.NSC.CAN.00000314_REL
[90] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "About RCMP in B.C." (21 June 2022), online

201.   On January 28, E Division's Real Time Intelligence Centre began actively providing situational awareness of all demonstration activity in British Columbia related to the Convoy and public health measures.

202.   Prior to the commencement of the blockade at Pacific Highway border crossing in Surrey, E Division maintained situational awareness and reported on protests and demonstrations relating to public health measures. The RCMP gathered intelligence with respect to these events and prepared operational responses on an "as needed" basis.

203.   On February 7, E Division activated a GSB command system to provide command and control support to the districts and other POJ. The GSB structure set up in E Division was distinct from the National GSB structure.

204.   The E Division Gold Command provided a dedicated strategic overview of policing preparations relative to areas affected by anti-mandate protests. This also included providing continuous and timely updates internally and to the Province during any protests, while also approving all external communications related to anti-mandate protests.[91] The Community Industry Response Group, ("CIRG") under the direction of a Gold Commander, prepared operational plans to respond to Convoy-related protests across the Province.[92]

205.   The Silver Command was in charge of executing the operational plans. Specialized RCMP Teams, and any attached policing resources deployed from outside E Division, provided support to the Silver Commander.[93]

206.   The Bronze Commands were responsible for policing events in consultation with, or at the direction of the Silver Commander. Geographic Bronze and Sub-Bronze Commanders provided continuous and timely updates on any protests.[94] Each district (Lower Mainland, Island, South East, North, and Highway Patrol) was also designated as a Geographical Bronze Level Command.

---

[91] PB.NSC.CAN.00002548_REL
[92] The Community-Industry Response Group: Quick Response Team (C-IRG QRT) works in teams using the Measured Approach to industry involved protest events. The C-IRG QRT conduct proactive and enforcement duties specific to resource related disputes and independent of local detachment operations. They operate in conjunction with other RCMP specialised units and other police agencies.
[93] PB.NSC.CAN.00002550_REL
[94] PB.NSC.CAN.00008075_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008757_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00008752_REL

9.3 Demonstrations at the Pacific Highway Border Crossing

207.   The Pacific Highway border crossing is between Surrey, British Columbia, and Blaine, Washington (the PacHighway POE).

208.   On February 5, the RCMP was aware of plans for a convoy of vehicles to meet in Aldergrove and drive to the PacHighway POE to protest. The CIRG was tasked with maintaining visibility of the demonstration and convoy activities. E Division GSB command was also tasked with maintaining situational awareness of the demonstration.[95]

209.   As of February 11, E Division began identifying RCMP employees with the proper class of truck/tow licences.

210.   On February 12, demonstrations increased at the PacHighway POE. At 3:45 AM, approximately 50 demonstrators were observed in a parking lot close to PacHighway POE.

211.   By 10:00 AM, the number of demonstrators had increased to between 150 and 200.

212.   Around 9:00 PM, the crowds began to dissipate, but a number of individuals on foot remained in the area. The RCMP directed traffic to other POEs in the area. The RCMP set up a barricade on a roadway leading towards the PacHighway POE. These protesters were mainly peaceful, but a few vehicles had breached police barricades and driven the wrong way down 176 street.[96]

213.   On February 13, RCMP moved protesters who had been blocking vehicle access from the PacHighway POE, and a small number of people were arrested.[97] At 11:52 AM, Surrey RCMP advised drivers and pedestrians to stay away from the area and use an alternate POE.[98]

214.   On February 14, the RCMP engaged demonstrators and arrested 12 people. Surrey RCMP officers were assisted by RCMP E Division, the Lower Mainland Integrated Tactical Troop and detachments in the surrounding area. Multiple vehicles that were blocking 176 Street were removed from the area and the road was reopened. The RCMP continued to set up concrete

---

[95] PB.NSC.CAN.00000566_REL
[96] PB.NSC.CAN.00002948_REL; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Traffic congestion surrounding Pacific Highway Border protest" (12 February 2022) online
[97] PB.NSC.CAN.00008656_REL
[98] Royal Canadian Mounterd Police, "Update on situation near the Pacific Highway Border Crossing" (13 February 2022), online

barriers and a police presence remained as the PacHighway POE was opened, traffic was diverted to other POEs.

215.   E-Division, using TSG and uniformed members, cleared all protesters along 176 Ave and opened access to the PacHighway POE to north and southbound traffic. A number of people refused to leave and had trucks and campers on the road.[99]

216.   On February 15, the PacHighway POE was open, with limited access southbound due to several barricades.[100] TSG and uniformed members continued to hold the northbound and southbound entrances to the PacHighway POE.

217.   On February 17, approximately a dozen demonstrators were still on site at on the corner of 176 Street and 8 Avenue. The RCMP set up checkpoints on side streets between 2nd and 4th Avenue.

218.   On February 18, the RCMP set up additional checkpoints to prepare for another convoy heading towards the PacHighway POE. That same date, the RCMP Commissioner sent a letter to the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General for British Columbia. The letter informed the Minister that the Commissioner was invoking sub article 9.4 of the British Columbia Police Service Agreement to temporarily deploy members to Ottawa.[101]

219.   On February 19, the RCMP had information about a convoy of approximately 400 vehicles, which included big rigs and passenger vehicles approaching the PacHighway POE.[102] Surrey RCMP worked with provincial and federal RCMP units, CBSA, and received assistance from numerous police detachments.[103]

220.   At 12:07 PM, the RCMP announced they would be conducting vehicle check stops and may divert non-local vehicles from the area. At 12:30 PM, as a preventative measure, and to help

[99] PB.NSC.CAN.00003737_REL
[100] PB.NSC.CAN.00008659_REL
[101] PB.NSC.CAN.00006866_REL
[102] PB.NSC.CAN.00008637_REL
[103] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Update: Law enforcement activity continues near the Pacific Highway Border Crossing" (19 February 2022), online

ensure public and officer safety, the RCMP prevented vehicles and pedestrians from accessing the PacHighway POE. The RCMP advised the public to use alternate POEs.[104]

221. At 5:07 PM, Surrey RCMP became aware of several incidents involving a group of aggressive protesters who surrounded members of the media. Police intervention was required to ensure that media members had safe passage to their vehicles.[105]

222. On February 20, between 80 and 100 demonstrators, and 40 vehicles remained at 8th Avenue. On February 21, a small group of demonstrators remained at the intersection of 176 Street and 8th Avenue. By February 23, no demonstrators were located at the PacHighway POE.

223. In addition to the demonstrations at the PacHighway POE, there were also demonstrations and protests in the Lower Mainland including convoys and counter protests in downtown Vancouver.

9.4 Other Activities – British Columbia

224. There were Convoy and other anti-mandate protests and demonstrations across the various RCMP Districts in British Columbia in early 2022. Between January 27 and the end of the Emergencies Act on February 23, the RCMP deployed resources in British Columbia to assist local municipal units with protests at POEs and at the legislative assembly.

9.4.1 Vancouver Island District

225. In the Vancouver Island District, there were several demonstrations at the Legislative Assembly in Victoria. On February 5, a convoy travelled from Campbell River to the Legislature in Victoria. On February 13, there was an anti-mandate protest at the Legislature in Victoria.[106] On February 19, protesters converged at the Legislature.[107]

---

[104] PB.NSC.CAN.00005134_REL
[105] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Update: Police investigating after members of the media swarmed by protesters in Surrey" (19 February 2022), online
[106] PB.NSC.CAN.00003480_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00003481_REL
[107] PB.NSC.CAN.00005134_REL

226.   Also on February 19, a convoy of 400 vehicles from Campbell River to Victoria was observed crossing the Malahat on the Island Highway. This convoy was expected to arrive at the Legislature in Victoria at 12:00 PM.[108] Approximately 400-500 vehicles and 600 protesters were observed in front of the Legislature in Victoria. A counter-protest at the Legislature also took place.[109]

227.   On February 26, another anti-mandate convoy travelled to Victoria. Approximately 600 protesters were observed at the Legislature and the RCMP was aware of another planned counter-protest.[110] Another pro-vaccine/pro-mandate group was also expected to be in Belleville to protest the Convoy.[111]

228.   There were also protests and demonstrations elsewhere on Vancouver Island. For example, on February 25, there was an anti-mandate convoy from Parksville to Qualicum Beach on Vancouver Island.

9.4.2   South East District

229.   In the South East District, protests blocked the Patterson POE in Rossland, BC on February 12. On February 19, approximately 600 'convoy' vehicles were observed heading to Osoyoos border crossing.[112]

9.4.3   North District

230.   The RCMP were also aware of various protests, including:

- a February 5 event for Freedom Convoy supporters at 100 Mile House;[113]
- a February 9 protest[114] and a convoy to Williams Lake City Hall; and,[115]

---

[108] PB.NSC.CAN.00005134_REL
[109] PB.NSC.CAN.00005134_REL
[110] PB.NSC.CAN.00006598_REL
[111] PB.NSC.CAN.00006598_REL
[112] PB.NSC.CAN.00008637_REL
[113] PB.NSC.CAN.00007374_REL
[114] PB.NSC.CAN.00007373_REL
[115] PB.NSC.CAN.00007373_REL

- February 18 and 19 slow rolls from Exeter Truck Road to Hwy 97 & 24 Intersection.[116]

10. RESPONSE TO CONVOY-RELATED PROTESTS IN MANITOBA

10.1 D Division

231. The RCMP are the POJ for most of Manitoba, except where municipalities have incorporated their own police service through cooperation with the RCMP. The RCMP in Manitoba provides policing services via 80 detachments with approximately 1000 uniformed members and 450 civilian and public service employees.[117]

232. Prior to the commencement of the blockade in Emerson, Manitoba, D Division maintained situational awareness on protests and demonstrations relating to public health measures. The RCMP gathered intelligence with respect to these events and prepared operational responses on an as needed basis.

10.2 Role in Manitoba related to Emerson blockade

10.2.1 The Emerson Blockade

233. On January 26 and January 27, the RCMP communicated with an individual identifying as the demonstration leader who indicated he was organizing a slow-roll demonstration on January 29 near the Canada-USA border crossing in Emerson (Emerson POE). RCMP advised this individual that any unlawful activity during the demonstration could result in criminal, traffic, or bylaw sanctions.

234. On January 27, the RCMP prepared a media release to advise of potential traffic delays at the Emerson POE.[118]

235. Between January 29 and 31, a number of slow-roll protests occurred at the Emerson POE. The RCMP observed the demonstration, but did not intervene or perform any arrests.

---

[116] PB.NSC.CAN.00000155_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00009562_REL
[117] Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "About the RCMP in Manitoba" (25 May 2021), online
[118] PB.NSC.CAN.00000565_REL

236.   On January 31, as a blizzard was expected, the RCMP advised the demonstration leader to end the protest. All protesters departed from the Emerson POE area by 9:00pm that day.[119]

237.   On February 2, a small group of semi-trucks and other vehicles returned to the Emerson POE for another slow-roll protest. The RCMP was again in communication with the same demonstration leader and it was agreed that trucks would not stop on the highway or otherwise impede traffic.[120] This demonstration ended on February 2 without incident.

238.   On February 9, the demonstration leader advised RCMP that a group of Convoy supporters may attempt to block the Emerson POE. Later that day, a number of vehicles travelled toward the Emerson POE.

239.   On February 10, approximately 50 semi-trailers, farm vehicles and passenger vehicles began blocking the Emerson POE. The RCMP assembled a Divisional Liaison Team (DLT), responsible for dialogue with protest leaders where they were available. This Team communicated with a lawyer representing the blockaders. Through discussions, the blockaders agreed to allow transports carrying livestock, CBSA and emergency vehicles through the blockade.[121]

240.   Between February 10 and 14, the Liaison Team remained in contact with blockaders to discuss a peaceful resolution to the blockade. During these discussions, RCMP observed a slow reduction in the number of vehicles occupying the area as time progressed.[122]

241.   On February 13, the DLT advised the blockade lawyer of potential enforcement actions, including charges which may be levied against blockaders. The blockade lawyer advised the DLT that the blockade might disperse soon.[123]

242.   On February 14, the RCMP completed a plan to initiate a takedown operation on February 15, should the blockade still remain.[124] That afternoon, demonstrators indicated the

[119] PB.NSC.CAN.00000565_REL
[120] PB.NSC.CAN.00000565_REL
[121] PB.NSC.CAN.00000135_REL; PB.CAN.00000774_REL, page 4
[122] PB.CAN.00000769_REL, page 2
[123] PB.CAN.00000774_REL
[124] PB.NSC.CAN.00000313_REL, page 3

blockade would likely end soon. On February 15, the blockaders agreed to depart midday on February 16.

243.   On February 16, as agreed, the blockade ceased and the Emerson POE resumed operation.[125]

10.2.2 Other Activities – Manitoba

244.   In addition to the events at the Emerson POE, the RCMP also maintained situational awareness of a number of related protests and demonstrations in Manitoba including protests at the Manitoba Legislative Building, various other slow-roll protests, and a demonstration outside the Canadian Human Rights Museum. The vast majority of these events were peaceful and required minimal police intervention.[126]

11.   RESPONSE TO THE BLOCKADE IN WINDSOR, ONTARIO

11.1   O Division

245.   In Windsor, Ontario, the Windsor Police Service (WPS) are the POJ. O Division maintains a detachment in Windsor with respect to federal policing matters, including Transnational Serious Organized Crime and border security between POEs. O Division, provided assistance to WPS and the OPP as they worked to resolve the Ambassador Bridge blockade.

11.2   Ambassador Bridge Blockade

---

[125] PB.NSC.CAN.00000565_REL
[126] PB.NSC.CAN.00000057_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000535_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000171_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000172_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000212_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000302_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000317_REL

246. The Ambassador Bridge is a privately owned bridge connecting Windsor to Detroit, Michigan. It is the busiest international border crossing between Canada and the U.S.

247. On February 6, the RCMP received unconfirmed reports of a number of vehicles making their way towards the Ambassador Bridge for a slow-roll demonstration.[127] The RCMP had previously maintained situational awareness of lawful anti-public health mandate demonstrations around the Ambassador Bridge.[128]

248. On February 7, demonstrators blocked traffic from the United States from entering Canada via the Ambassador Bridge.[129]

249. On February 8, the Ambassador Bridge closed.[130] The WPS began working to divert traffic to the Blue Water International Bridge connecting Sarnia, ON and Port Huron, MI.[131]

250. On February 10, WPS contacted the Minister of Public Safety to request RCMP assistance with respect to the Ambassador Bridge blockade. That same day, the RCMP redeployed a TSG, that was deployed in Ottawa, to Windsor.[132]

251. On February 10 and 11, OPP members arrived and assumed the role of lead agency in coordinating enforcement action. The deployed RCMP members received direction from OPP, and attended operational briefings with OPP, WPS, CBSA, and emergency medical services with respect to planning any potential arrest or enforcement plans.

252. On February 11, the Province of Ontario declared a state of emergency. The City of Windsor also obtained an injunction allowing peace officers to clear blocked or impeded access to the Ambassador Bridge and roadways approaching the Ambassador Bridge.[133] Following the injunction, police ordered people to disperse, or face tickets and arrest. The OPP Provincial Liaison Team delivered a letter from the Minister of Public Safety to blockade organizers.

---

[127] PB.NSC.CAN.00000107_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000102_REL
[128] PB.NSC.CAN.00000098_REL
[129] PB.NSC.CAN.00000107_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000108_REL
[130] PB.NSC.CAN.00000113_REL
[131] PB.NSC.CAN.00000191_REL; PB.NSC.CAN.00000121_REL
[132] PB.NSC.CAN.00000568_REL
[133] PB.NSC.CAN.00002713_REL

253.   That same date, O Division also directed two additional Emergency Response Teams to Windsor.[134]

254.   On February 12, RCMP members assisted OPP and WPS members in enforcing the City of Windsor's injunction. Police worked to clear the Ambassador Bridge of vehicles and demonstrators during the morning. RCMP members liaised between OPP and Transport Canada to respond to OPP's request to restrict airspace over the Ambassador Bridge and blockade area during the enforcement of the injunction order.

255.   Later that day, police also worked to install barriers and secure areas to prevent reoccupation. Subsequently, O Division received an anonymous tip stating that an unknown individual had placed an explosive device beyond a police blockade. RCMP worked with WPS to investigate the tip, which was later determined not to be credible.[135]

256.   On February 13, at the request of WPS, O Division deployed additional RCMP members to the Ambassador Bridge to assist OPP and WPS in keeping the Ambassador Bridge clear.[136] Late that night, the Ambassador Bridge fully reopened.[137]

257.   After the reopening of the Ambassador Bridge, the RCMP continued to maintain situational awareness and report intelligence regarding planned demonstrations at or around the Ambassador Bridge.

---

[134] PB.NSC.CAN.00000568_REL
[135] PB.NSC.CAN.00000141_REL
[136] PB.NSC.CAN.00000154_REL
[137] PB.NSC.CAN.00000155_REL

APPENDIX I – CHARTS

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Emergency Measures Regulations (EMR)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">PROVISION</td><td>ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY</td></tr>
<tr><td>1) Designate critical infrastructure and protected places</td><td>Critical infrastructure means infrastructure means the following places, including any land on which they are located:

• Airports, aerodromes, heliports, harbours, ports, piers, lighthouses, canals, railways stations, railways, tramway lines, bus stations, bus depots, and truck depots.
• Infrastructure for the supply of utilities, such as water, gas, sanitation, and telecommunications.
• International and interprovincial bridges and crossings.
• Power generation and transmission facilities.
• Hospitals and locations where COVID-19 vaccines are administered.
• Trade corridors and international border crossings, including ports of entry, ferry
• All Peace Officers, including RCMP terminals, customs offices, bonded warehouses, and sufferance warehouses.

The following are designated as protected places:

• Critical infrastructures as defined above.
• Parliament Hill and the Parliamentary Precinct.
• Official residences.
• Government and defence buildings.
• Note: MLA and MP constituency offices are not included as government buildings.
• Monuments, including war memorials and cenotaphs, and any objects associated with honouring or remembering people who died as a consequence of a war, including a cemetery.
• Any other places as designated by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

What does this mean for *Police*?

• The Federal Government has clarified that police can proactively target-harden critical infrastructure and designated protected places in anticipation of unlawful assemblies.</td><td>All Peace Officers, including RCMP</td></tr>
<tr><td>2) Prohibit public assembly expected to lead to a breach of the peace (unlawful assembly).</td><td>A person must not participate in a public assembly that may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of the peace by:

• The serious disruption of the movement of persons or goods or the serious interference with trade;
• The interference with the functioning of critical infrastructure; or
• The support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property.

A person must not travel to or within a place where an unlawful assembly is underway.

Travel Exemptions:

• People who reside, work, or are moving through the assembly area for reasons other than participating in or facilitating the assembly are exempt;
• People who, within the assembly area, act with the permission of a peace officer are exempt;
• A peace officer is exempt; and
• A government employee or agent acting in the execution of their duties is exempt.</td><td>All Peace Officers, including RCMP</td></tr>
</table>

		A person must not use, collect, provide, make available, or invite a person to provide property to facilitate or participate in any unlawful assembly or for the purpose of benefiting anyone who is facilitating or participating in such an activity. **What does this mean for Police?** • Police can prohibit people from travelling to participate or facilitate the occurrence of an unlawful assembly, mindful of the applicable travel exemptions noted above.	
3)	Prohibit a person from causing a minor (person under 18) to be involved in such an assembly)	A person must not cause a minor to participate in an unlawful assembly. Please note that there are currently no prohibitions related to other vulnerable persons, such as elders or people with disabilities. A person must not cause a minor to travel to or within 500 metres of an unlawful assembly. *What does this mean for Police?* • Police can prohibit minors from attending or travelling to an unlawful assembly, mindful of the applicable travel exemptions noted above.	All Peace Officers, including RCMP
4)	Prohibit entry in Canada by a foreign national for the purposes of participating in such an assembly	**Prohibited Entry Exemptions:** • A person registered as an Indian under the Indian Act; • A person recognized as a Convention refugee or similar under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations; • A person issued a temporary resident permit under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or seeks to enter Canada as a protected temporary resident under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations; • A person who seeks to enter Canada for the purpose of making a claim for refugee protection; • A protected person; • A person whose presence in Canada is in the national interest. *What does this mean for Police?* • Police can assist CBSA with prohibiting a foreign national from entering Canada who intends to participate in or facilitate an unlawful assembly, mindful of the applicable entry exemptions noted above.	All Peace Officers, including RCMP and CBSA
5)	Direct that persons make available essential goods and services if directed to do so by the Commissioner of the RCMP	Any person must make available and render the essential goods and services requested by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Commissioner of the RCMP, or a person acting on their behalf for the removal, towing, and storage of any vehicle, equipment, structure, or other object that is part of a blockade. Any request made for such essential goods and services may be made in writing or given verbally by a person acting on their behalf. Any verbal request must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Requests for such essential goods and services must be complied with the day referred to in the request, earlier than the day on which the declaration of the public order emergency expires or is revoked, or earlier than the day these Emergency Measures Regulations are repealed.	Persons with authority delegated by Federal Public Safety Minister orthe Commissioner of the RCMP (delegated to E-Div CO)

	What does this mean for Police? • Police can require individuals and companies to provide essential goods and services for towing, removing, and storing blockade vehicles, equipment, or other objects immediately. • The RCMP confirmed that the RCMP Police Commissioner has delegated these powers to the Commanding Officer of RCMP "E" Division, who may further delegate these powers to Gold Commander Officers.	
Compliance	Peace Officers: In the case of a failure to comply with these Emergency Measures Regulations, any peace officer (as defined in the Criminal Code and including the RCMP, conservation officers, and highway patrol officers) may take the necessary measures to ensure the compliance with these Regulations and with any provincial or municipal laws and allow for the prosecution of failure to comply. Contravention of Regulations: In the case of a failure to comply with these Emergency Measures Regulations, any peace officer may take the necessary measures to ensure the compliance and allow for the prosecution for that failure to comply. Fines and Imprisonment: • **Summary Conviction:** A fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both. • Indictment: A fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, or both.	

Emergency Economic Measures Order (EEMO)		
PROVISION	DEFINITION	ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
1) Prohibit individuals and entities from engaging in financial transactions prohibited by the Emergency Measures Regulations	**Requirements:** • Any entity (corporation, trust, partnership, fund, unincorporated association or organization, or foreign state) must cease dealing in any property that is owned, held, or controlled by a designated person (any individual or entity that is engaged in activities prohibited by the Emergency Measures Regulations), or a person acting on behalf of a designated person. • These entities must cease facilitating any transaction related to prohibited activities in the Emergency Measures Regulations or fund people involved in unlawful assemblies. • Banks and other financial institutions must cease providing financial services intended to fund unlawful assemblies. • Vehicle insurance providers must cease providing any financial or related services to vehicles being used in an unlawful assembly. This does not apply to insurance policy that was valid prior to the Public Order. **New Tools for Financial Institutions and Police:** Requires banks and other financial entities, such as crowdfunding platforms, payment service providers (e.g., PayPal), insurance companies, and crypto exchange to: • Review (and continually monitor) to see if they possess/control the property (i.e., bank accounts, cryptocurrencies, and other assets) of a person involved in the unlawful public assemblies. • Freeze/suspend their account, vehicle insurance, crypto wallet, lending products and investments. No court order is needed. • Cease providing them financial services or facilitating transactions. • Register with and report suspicious transactions to FINTRAC. • Without delay, disclose to the RCMP or CSIS the existence of property of a person involved in the unlawful assemblies and any information about a transaction or proposed transaction. • Unfreeze their account, crypto wallet, lending products and investments if they are no longer involved in unlawful assemblies. **Transport Canada Support:** Transport Canada offers a Strategic Enforcement Strategy for consideration by police services, local governments and transportation authorities of jurisdiction, cities, and provinces with respect to illegal activity involving commercial motor vehicles as it relates to the Economic Measures Order. This strategy involves two key elements: Communications • Communicating clearly and directly to protestors (and to Canadians) about the illegal activities at play - and their impact - could incent compliance and "peel off" some trucks once their owners realize the potential economic costs and risks. Transport Canada has provided the provinces and territories with suggested key messages. Enforcement • Police can issue tickets for each vehicle in contravention of provisions; conduct surveillance, gather plate numbers, and driver information; and tow, impound, and in some cases cease implicated vehicles. • Provincial transportation authorities can support local law enforcement in managing vehicle flows by conducting roadside safety and emissions inspections with maximum penalties for infractions; use or establish provincial emergency legislation to create additional offences for illegal blockades; and assess surveillance data to determine if further investigations are necessary. **Duty to Disclose:** • Federal, provincial, or territorial institutions (including the RCMP) must disclose at their discretion any information with financial entities for purposes of the Order (e.g., name and address of a driver participating in an unlawful public assembly).	RCMP and/or CSIS, but Peace Officers may take the necessary measures to ensure compliance (e.g., report suspicious activity to RCMP or CSIS)